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Abstract
After short historical remarks, a general structure of an ethic theory is proposed, encompassing
principles, values, priority rules between such values, basic norms, rules and rights up to customs and
rules of good conduct. It is shown that every concrete moral, derived from an ethic theory may include
conflicts between norms or values. Particularly such conflicts are known in the force field between
technological requirements and basic norms. A principle that may help to resolve such conflicts is
presented. It is expressed as the principle of conservation of the conditions for responsible behaviour.
Some applications for engineering ethics are given.
Keywords: ethics, engineering ethics, technology, moral conflicts, conservation of conditions, re-
sponsible behaviour.
1. Introduction
Moral issues in technology have always been discussed. So Thukydides is reporting
about the blaming of soldier as coward using iron swords instead of the old bronze
weapons. Since during the battle an iron sword would not broke anymore, thus they
prevent the opportunity for the soldier to show his quality and virtue of braveness
in the fight man against man without weapons. This former critique against a new
technology has made use from an obvious moral argument.
After the atomic bomb 1945 the moral turn in discussing about science and
scientists diffused to the area of engineering in the early 70ies when the reach
of modern technology became obvious by the first civil applications of nuclear
energy, computers, world wide communication up to the genetic and fertilisation
1This Paper has been generated by an extension of my presentation at the Professional Sem-
inar of Prof. Hronszky, Chair for Innovation Management and History of Technology, Budapest
University for Technology and Economics in May, 21st , 2001. The visit has been granted by
SOKRATES/ERASMUS Programme of the European Union.
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technologies in our days. Thinking about technology becomesmore andmoremoral
laden and the rise of the concept of responsibility began after the disseminating book
‘Principle Responsibility’ by Hans JONAS [17], [18].
After the 80ies a lot of ethical codes of conducts has been passed by scien-
tific and engineering professional associations, collecting a set of convictions that
reflected the experience of a possible non-controllable technological development
and the necessity to check and balance the economic and environmental interest
with better arguments. Nevertheless, these ethic code of conducts were designed
not very systematically; there was an emphatic sound to hear suspecting everywhere
immoral interest and not legitimated structures of power.
Therefore, amore rational foundation of such guidelines andmoral conviction
are wanted and it remains the task for experts in Ethics and Philosophy to look for
plausible arguments how to find, to found, to justify and to deduce moral statements
concerning technology and engineering practices.
So we may have some sufficient reasons to reflect about ethics when being
Engineer:
• World has becomemore complex due to technology. Therefore, it has become
difficult to integrate comprehensively the world of awareness (Merkwelt) and
world of impacts (Wirkwelt, cf. K.O. APEL [1]).
• The interaction between social and technological systems has become subject
of scientific investigation since 30 years. Result: In shaping technology, this
interactions cannot be neglected anymore
• Due to the complexity of technologically driven economy and society, new
forms of moral conflicts will arise on professional working level.
• Responsibility has becomea central term–butwho is responsible individually
for a collective decision?
• New orientation and new vocational trainings for engineers are necessary.
This includes ethical issues as well as political ones.
• The new technologies have a tendency to become more universal due to
digitalisation and ‘biologisation’. This is widening the scope of potential
future possibilities never faced before.
• Religious, ethnic, cultural and traditional value systems will continue to lose
their binding force due to globalisation. The pluralism in ethics has become
unavoidable. Thus, helps and guidelines are necessary for orientation.
2. General Structure of an Ethical Theory
There have been many attempts in the history of Ethics to conceptualise an ethical
theory as a kind of a calculus. The similitude of the aimed structure of a rational
ethic theory with systems of axioms in non-complete logical calculi is stunning.
Removing one axiom, the logical calculus is underestimated. Adding a further
axiom that cannot be derived from the already present ones it is possible without
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causing any contradiction. In some calculi such an adding creates a complete
calculus.
Otherwise it cannot be expected that ethics will be able to be designed as a
complete calculus that is free from contradictions, too. Nevertheless, there have
beenmany efforts in the history ofPhilosophy. SoB.Spinoza has brought up the idea
of an ethica more geometrico, whereas geometry was a contemporary paradigm for
a mature, deductive and throughout formal science which would allow to conclude
everything if the premises are known and certain. EvenG.W. LEIBNIZ,1 J. LOCKE,2
I. KANT,3 and others have looked forward for such approaches. These approaches
may be useful as kind of guidelines if one wants to deal with ethics rationally.
Whereas an ethical theory as a comprehensive building of coherent convic-
tions, principles, values and normative statements is not erected axiomatically, a
concrete moral may be built up by the observed convergence of conviction people
have with overwhelming majority. This empirical approach does not suspend the
task, to ground, to justify and to deduce such convictions as moral statements from
more general ethical principles and well-defined values. This way to an erection of
an ethic theory allows mapping the different arguments, contradictions, differences
and so on, occurring in ethical discourse. Thus the presentation of a general struc-
ture of an ethical theory fulfils two tasks. First, there is an educational purpose: a
general structure allows to show on which level the different moral statements are
made, it facilitates teaching ethics and it allows to find easier where conflicts and
controversies take place. Second, the consequences of altering or substituting one
of the leading principles or values can be demonstrated very quickly.
On the other hand, a general structure of an ethic theory is not equivalent with
a general ethics itself. So it is not the aim to write down ethics that should be valid
to deduce a moral for all cases and all times. I. Kant was convinced that there exist
a universal moral law that can be recognised by man.4 Today we believe rather in
a pluralism of values in ethics, but the search for a principle that may give support
to deduce moral statements and judgements in concrete cases, has not stopped until
now.
In the meanwhile a lot of so called partial or area ethics has been designed and
discussed. This is presumably due to the considerable pressure of decisions that
have to be made in this extremely fast developing fields like science, engineering,
medical health. This article is written by the conviction, that so called area-ethics
are not genuine ethics in themselves but different expressions of a general ethic
theory that has been modified and adapted for different purposes and application
fields. Therefore, environmental ethics should not differ in principle from an ethic
1Cf. G. W. LEIBNIZ: Noveaux Essays (IV 12, 8).
2Cf. J. LOCKE: Essay IV (IV 3, 18 and 20; IV 4, 7 and 9, IV 12, 8
3I. KANT: Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) (KdRVB 508/A 480) and Critique
of Practical Reason (Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft) (A 45, 167); cf. also HÖSLE (1990, pp. 123 f.)
[14].
4I. KANT: Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten),
GMS, BA 50, Vol. VII. (1991, p. 50), [19].
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in medicine and an engineering ethics should be regarded as a specified application
of such a general ethics with a structure that is common to all particular ethics.
The deeper reason for this conviction relies to the fact, that there is a tremen-
dous consent in basic values in nearby each culture, nation and religion. The
essential difference between them lies in the priority relations between the values:
For a journalist the value of truth has another range in a set of values than for a
politician or a manager. Both believe in the content of the value ‘truth’, but in
conflicting situation they will pond them differently. The same may hold for the
priority rule in different religions.
In order to show how this shift of priorities will generate an altered set of
normative statements, the following structure will be useful.
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Fig. 1. General Structure of an Ethical Theory. Explanations cf. text below.
Fig. 1 indicates that it should be possible in principle, to generate a concrete
moral system by this scheme by ‘plugging in’ certain values and principles. If one
makes a choice for a certain principle and a selected set of values, specifying them
with defined priority relations normative statements (prescriptive statements like
‘it is obliged’, ‘it is allowed’ etc.) can be formulated. Each legal law for instants
represents such a normal statement, too. Using the human power of judgement
(‘Urteilskraft’ according to I. KANT), should it be possible to derive rules for ac-
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tion and prescriptions for ways or types of behaviour.5 At last but not least, correct
conduct, customs and usual type of symbolic laden behaviour like rituals could be
grounded in such a scheme. Institutions must be able to execute sanctions; i.e.
reward and punishment (in a very general sense), otherwise each ethics, forming a
concrete moral, remains teeth less. The whole structure is entangled into institu-
tional structures. Institutions like organisations, authorities, firms, communities are
incorporating norms; moreover they do represent norms. Without these respective
values, institutions could not exist – a finding, already made by Max WEBER [41].
Principles can be regarded as trials to provide theoretical concepts that cover
ethical and moral experience. They offer a possibility to classify such experiences.
Mostly they contain a procedural part with which one is enabled to judge actions
and decisions according to the respective moral.
The arrows in Fig. 1 indicate the direction of deductive argumentation often
applied for didactical use. In practical terms the starting point will be the other
way around – a scenario, a concrete situation that is characterized by an n-fold
alternative (n options) to decide. According to the situation the different levels in
the structure showed in Fig. 1may be used to answer the question of KANT: ‘What
we have to do?’6
2.1. Principles
There different principles have been developed during the history of Ethics. It is not
necessary to list them all here. The different principle may be inserted within the
scheme in Fig. 1 like ‘plug ins’ in order to test their consequences. Nevertheless, it
should point out that they could not be selected completely independent froma given
value set and its priority relations. Moreover, it can be shown that there exist some
relations between the different principles. The one principle is more compatible
with a primordial value than another one. So the Greatest Happiness Principle if St.
Mill’ s Utilitarianism prefers welfare and happiness as a guiding value. The Golden
Rule7 corresponds more or less to the value to avoid harm, the Principle that Man
is part of Nature as an ecological paradigm prefers more or less the life conditions
on the whole earth as prior to individual or economic interests. The Categorical
Imperative by Kant can be regarded as a control procedure, whether the own way
5A historical condensation of such ways of action, conduct and behaviour can be found within the
discussion of the virtues, e.g. by Aristotle: Ethica Nikomachica.
6The second famous basic question, posed in: I. KANT: Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der
Reinen Vernunft), KdRV A 805/B 833, (1788), [20]. It is easy to see that the different directions
within the scheme in Fig. 1 (arrows) when making conclusions must not lead necessarily to the same
result.
7Already put forward by Kong Fu TSE (CONFUCIUS): ‘Do not do to others that you would not
have done to yourself’ (cf. SPIER [39], p. 17), it may be found also in Islamic Sunna Writings: ‘None
of you truly has faith if he does not desire for his brother what he desires for himself’. Cited according
to Encyclopaedia for Applied Ethics; cf. SHEPERD, [38], p. 737).
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could be apt to a general law for everybody in all cases, and as a generalisation
of the Golden Rule. With respect to the principle to conserve the conditions for
a responsible behaviour, it has been shown that it is a generalisation of Kant’ s
Categorical Imperative. Other principles have been offered like the pragmatic view
of D. Mieth, that problem solvers should not generate greater problems by solving
the simpler ones.8 It is obvious that in the field of practical moral one is inclined
to select such principles that are more adapted to a regional, local area of problems
like genetics, information and communication technology, waste management and
so on. Since there are relations between the principles, a transformation between
the respective resulting norms should be possible. Sometimes it is possible to
show, that with different principles and different value systems a nonempty set of
equivalent normative statements can be produced. This explains why we have so
many discussions about principles and values whereas in everyday practice most
people would agree to a basic set of normative statements without hesitation.
2.2. Value Systems
In everyday life we make decisions by preferring or rejecting goods or options.
This represents an evaluation of these goods and options according to values. M.
SCHELER has proposed such a system of values, classified according to circles of
aesthetics, religion, everyday experience, community etc.9
Whenever an exploration of values could be performed empirically, e.g. by
inquiries or by analysing basic texts of cultures, religions, communities, constitu-
tions and so on, one can find that the values are quite constant and stable over a
great range of history, cultures and religions, but the grounding ideas are different
and moreover the priority relations show considerable variations dependent from
time, culture and religion.10 This is what we call value change (Wertewandel) and
which can be observed immediately when regarding the globalisation process.
For the sake of evaluation of technology the GermanAssociation of Engineers
(VDI) has proposed a list of possible values, and a discussion about the conflicts
between these values has taken place. The VDI has not proposed any priority rela-
tion but it has recommend to start a discussion about evaluation of technology with
this catalogue of values, trying to establish the adapt priority rules that expresses
8Firstly received as an oral communication, Tübingen 1991. Cf. also WILS, MIETH [44].
9M. SCHELER [36] Distinguished between the value classes of the pleasant, of the nobility, of
the beauty, of rights and, of the epistemology of truth, and of the holy. Scheler put forward a certain
apriorism of the emotionality. According to Scheler, the hierarchical order imposed on the set of
value can be reckoned a priori (cf. SCHELER [36], Vol. 2, p. 10).
10Formally, a relation of preferences or priorities can be seen as a well-defined order on a set of
discrete values. This view excludes conflicts between values. As a model a hierarchical graph could
serve. The work of KÜNG [26], [27] and KÜNG, KUSCHEL [28] that has investigated such a value
system shows that the priority relation differs from religion to religion, but the set of values and their
respective meaning seem to be comparable to a wide extent.
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the moral world view of the evaluator. This would allow making the discussion
more transparent. The values are (in alphabetical order to avoid any suggestions):
Development of Individual Life Quality, Ecological Quality, Health, Safety, Soci-
etal Quality, Technological Performance, Welfare (economy, macro-level), Welfare
(individual, micro-level).11
The conflict relations between the values are corresponding to the non-decided
situations with respect to the priority relations. It should be noted here very clearly
that it might be happen that for each priority relation that is applied the situation
may lead to unacceptable consequences. This we call a moral dilemma.
It is a misunderstanding, even within the field of practical application, that
conflicts could be removed by means of rational ethics in any cases. Here are rules
how to solve such kinds of conflicts to a certain extent, WERHANE [43], LENK
[30]. but conflicts represents rather a constitutive element of an ethic than an evil
that has to be avoided at any price. Such a certain non-consequentialism12 should
be possible.
Catalogues of values can be extended,13 either for the purpose of clarification
or in order to remove or attenuate conflict relations among them, but when skipping
only one value from the VDI – Octagon of values, a comprehensive evaluation of
technology does not work anymore (RAPP [34])14
2.3. Basic Norms
Norms,15 expressed in normative statements, are rules of conducting to aim at
unified and valid behaviour in a societal group or community, or in society at all
that defines expectance of behaviour and rules of action with respect to certain
values. When an individual or a group violate norms a community must have the
11 Cf. The recommendation Nr. 3780 of the German Association of Engineers (Verein Deutscher
Ingenieure VDI); VDI [40]. To avoid any misinterpretations: The authors of this recommendation put
emphasis that the eight values and their interpretation are representing a proposal, not an obligation.
Nevertheless, to remove one value from this octagonwill produce a deficit when evaluating technology
with the help of them. For the discussion around this recommendations cf. also RAPP [34].
12 HUBIG [16], [15] has introduced the term ‘non-consequentialism’. To confess it honestly, I am
very sympathetic with this term.
13For instance with the values stability, error friendliness, introduced by von E. U. von
WEIZSÄCKER [42]. Cf. KORNWACHS [21].
14Cf. KORNWACHS, NIEMEIER ([25], p. 1560, Table 17). Value catalogues are very sensible
against any removal of one or more values – they will loose their utility. Beside there is a stunning
similarity with non-complete axiom systems in logics. To remove one axiom from the catalogue that
defines a calculus makes the calculus ‘underdetermined’, but it is possible to add further axioms (not
derivable from the other axioms by definition) without producing contradictions.
15We should distinguish betweenmoral norms expressing values and technical ‘norms’ as technical
standards like Deutsche Industrie Norm (DIN) that provides rules for producing products, regularities
for procedures definitions for key terms in technology.
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possibility to apply reward and punishment regulations.16
Normative statements include ‘it is allowed that …’ or ‘it is forbidden that
…’, or ‘it is an obligation that …’. Having a deontological character, they urge us
to certain actions whereas values define aims or goals of action.17 A given set of
norms of a concrete community tells us something about the social world in which
the members of such a community live. Norms, uttered by a subject or prescribed
by an institution do relate more to real world than values, and they have a more
forcing obligatory character.
As examples for moral norms the well-known Ten Commands in the Book
Exodusmay serve. As an example of legal norms thewell-known lawsmaybe taken.
Whereas legal norms are only valid for a certain time and area, the validity of moral
norms is conceived to be invariant from individuals and institutions uttering them.
Since there is a great convergence of values between the cultures and religions, a
certain convergence of acceptance of basic norms should be observed. (Cf. KÜNG
[27]).
GERT [10] has proposed a certain modern Decalogue. It is easy to show that
these norms express values explicitly and that most of us would agree if one neglects
the order of this commands as a priority order: ‘1. Don’t kill. 2. Don’t cause pain.
3. Don’t make anybody disable. 4. Don’t reduce freedom and opportunities. 5.
Don’t cut any rights. Don’t steal. 7. Keep your promises. 8. No frauds and trickery.
9. Behave according to laws. 10. Fulfil your duties’. The relevant values can be
mapped: ‘1. Live; 2. Free from Harm; 3. Quality of Personal Life; 4. Liberty; 5.
Respect of Personal Rights; 6. Respect of Property; 7. Reliability and Stability; 8.
Trust; 9. Stability; 10. Trust and Reliability’.
2.4. Rules and Rights
Basic rights, as defined in modern western constitutions, are related to the human
rights very closely. They define rights that in everybody has right to live not because
of being a member of a community or society but due to the fact being a man. This
cannot be foundedwithout any recourse to natural right ideas. This idea presupposes
a definition of the nature of man. It is possible of course that basic rights (including
right to opposite, refer to consciousness) may collide with the positivistic view
of law, according to that laws has to be obeyed without limitation – pacta sunt
servanda18.
It is not the place here to discuss all the distinctions between several types of
basic and human rights. (Cf. KORNWACHS [22].) The important point with respect
to ethics in the field of engineering – and elsewhere – whether there are intangible
rights at all and whether they may collide with some technical and organizational
16Ranging from a warning up to the execution of an individual.
17As an example: The normative statement sounds: You should not kill. The relevant value can
be found as being alive. Life is a personal good.
18Contracts have to be fulfilled at any case (cf. CICERO, De Officiis 3, 12).
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systems that require a delimitation of basic rights for the sake of safety or stability.
Nobody would delimit human rights, freedom of thoughts, consciousness, religion
and speech, the personal liberties, political rights and economic rights without
necessity and on a lawful basis, but the question rises whether modern technology
forces us to delimit such rights due to their organisational structure (like safety issues
with material flow of Plutonium), the possibility of abuse (like harmful chemical
and biological materials applied for purpose of terrorism) or due to the duty to rid
of effects and consequences of modern technology like climatic change, flood, acid
rain etc. This is not only a problem for the politician but it starts to begin a problem
for the engineer as the shaper of technology and therefore shaper of conditions of
our every day life.
3. Conflicts
3.1. Moral Judgement
The field of basic conflicts comes into focus here. A moral judgment of such
conflicts is running along amatching procedure that can easily be shownwith respect
to our scheme in Fig. 1. Each concrete situation of decision or planned action as
well as scheduled actions can be evaluated with respect to the commensurability
the deducibility from the justification and the foundation with the Principles, the
Values ordered by priorities and, if they are not known, by the present norms.
If we only look for intentions of act and judge them morally, the result would
lead to an Intentional Ethics or ethics by Consciousness (Gesinnungsethik). Eval-
uating the rules of actions, according to which decisions and actions has been per-
formed or planned; one would speak of a Principle Ruled Ethics (Prinzipienethik).
If one evaluates an action itself, a more law-oriented ethics (Ethics of Laws and
Rights) would be the result. Looking at the effect of actions (and thoughts), their
consequences and side effect, Teleological Ethics will result. All these kinds of
ethic respective evaluation procedure have advantages and disadvantages and it is a
nice exercise in course of applied and theoretical ethic to discuss cases of individual
behaviour in the light of the different ethic types. It has become clear that all these
special views may solve some cases and other ones do not and vice versa. This
leads to the development of an Ethics of Responsibility, which tries to avoid the
particular obstacles.
There are some reasons for this. A pure Teleological Ethic cannot exclude the
violation of human rights (e.g. in thinkable extreme cases of terrorism) and Principle
Rules Ethics disregards the non-anticipated or not acceptable side effects (e.g. in
case of so called ‘crusades’ or wars for liberty). If one accepts that respecting the
moral conviction of an individual as well as the freedom of his consciousness are
very important values to protect, one must accept that there is a plurality in ethics
that cannot be dismissed anymore. So the conditions to speak freely about ethics, to
negotiate norms in a society and to debate principles and values in a discourse free
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from pressure and power constraints should be regarded or at least as a value itself.
This value is considered to ensure the condition for the possibility to establish a
rational ethics at all.19 So one to has leave the idea of a universal moral that is
valid at any time and any places without any conditions for all men. On the other
hand, the task of moral judgement has become a duty for everyone and this task
must be find forms, for instance mediated by a philosophically free debate about
engineering ethics among engineers, technicians and users of technology.
3.2. Some Contemporary Confusion
Particular engineers and people dealing with ethics in this field – to avoid the term
engineering ethic as a partial ethics – could face some disappointments in this field.
First, as it already has been stated, the ethical theory looks like a calculus with
principle as axioms, defined values as forming rules and a semantic defined by the
validity of derived norms (whether they are morally true or not). But it is looking
only like that; the power of deduction cannot be applied without modification of
moral arguments. Even the use of deontic logic as a modified modal logic does
not provide us with the material definition of values and the priority rules must be
set, they are not derivable from principles, but can only be supported by additional
meta-rules (see below).
Second, using the scheme in Fig. 1, sometimes a different ‘plug-ins’ of prin-
ciples, values, and varied priority relations may lead to same or similar normative
statements. Mostly the debate about ethics in engineering runs on the level of a
concrete moral, i.e. on the level of normative statements.
Third, there is a great consent about values and normative statements, but not
about priorities. But conflicts are mostly generated by different priorities between
values and not by differences about values at themselves. So everyone may agree
to a value defined code of ethical conduct – in case of a conflict priorities must be
decided in order to solve it.
Fourth, the most different opinions may be found in the field of concrete
rules, the ways to act, the actual assessment of impacts, risks or side effects and
their acceptability and in the field of ascribing responsibility on an individual or
collective level.
Thus the experience is predominant that there is no concrete moral (i.e. an
ethic laden with concrete ‘plug-ins’) that can avoid moral conflicts.
3.3. Types of Conflicts
The best-known conflicts are very general and they can be characterized as conflicts
between values. So the problem is known what kind of (real or truth) needs should
19Cf. HÖSLE [14], APEL [1], HABERMAS [12], [13] as most prominent authors dealing with the
so-called transcendental pragmatic foundation of ethics.
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be more important, the common goods or the private consumption. Protective
measures to ensure safety may run against liberty rights and flexibility, the use of
natural resources goods as economical goodsmay run into conflict with environment
as an exhaustible resource, individual health is in conflict with general welfare, the
individual ‘right for fun’ may collide with social duties.
Conflicts between value priority systems are represented by the questions like:
Economy prior to ecology or vice versa? Would be preferred firstly the image, than
the justice; or firstly the company’ s interest, then legal concern? Conflicts between
norms can be shown in the field where health and healing affects problems of
human dignity like cloning and the use of generative cells from embryos. The
problem of triage: who comes first when applying help with limited capacity in
man made catastrophe like war, accidents and so on? Even the question of justice
of distribution of goods, opportunities and chances will raise conflicts on the level
of norms.20
The most obvious conflicts have been recognised as conflicts between inter-
ests that may be justified themselves by the role the proponents play. The difficult
relations between producer, supplier, provider, user, client, and purchaser respec-
tively show the multitude of these spectra, but these kind of conflicts cannot be
reduced simply to conflict between norms or values. The conflicts between inter-
ests can be modelled by game theory where the gain of the one is the loss of the
other. So it may be reflected whether it is morally meaningful, to generate or to
induce such antagonistic situations. If there are rules how to play the game, this
may be helpful to ritualise and to solve interest conflicts like in democratic politics
or in civil codes. Nevertheless there are situations in which such rules are not valid
anymore or there are no existing rules at all like in fighting terrorism versus the
deliberation of a nation or a group from the siege of unbelievers.
First of all, non-solved or badly solved conflicts will produce further conflicts.
One of the starting points of conflicts can be figured out to the unclear priorities
between high-level values. This may be regarded as a deficit of conducting power
inhuman society as in firms, institutions and groups as well. Another possibility
that may be excluded here is the willingly producing of dilemmatic situation in
order to reduce the options of another person.
20ZOGLAUER [45], p. 30, [46], [47] made the point that conflicts between moral norms on the
one hand and between values on the other hand show the same logical structure. Each conflict with
respect to values can be reformulated as a conflict with respect to norms. Norms are institutional facts
as J. R. SEARLE [37] has pointed out. The distinction between institutional and natural facts has been
exemplified by K. POPPER [33], Vol. I, pp. 70–71: One is not able to draw more coins from a bourse
than the number of coins is really within (natural fact), but it is possible to overdraw the bank account,
presupposed there has been negotiations before (institutional fact). – Each conflict between norms
disables to conclude rules for actions. Such a conflict could be considered as a menace or limitation
of rational arguments in ethics. In much situation such conflicts are solvable, e.g. by readjusting
priority rules or meta-rules, but there is no guarantee for any cases by principle.
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3.4. Force Fields
But there might be other causes of conflicts. We must face that in highly differenti-
ated societies with a high-level of division of work, competence and mobility into
different cultures, there do exist different cultural fields (or moral fields), applied
to the same time with the requirement to be respected by one and the same person.
These different fields are not only mediated by different religions (like Christian
or Islamic cultural area) but also by a cross over of role specific value priorities in
professional live.
Thus an engineer may be confronted by two requirements that he has to regard
at the same time. The economic issue on the one hand and the safety issue on the
other hand give rise to a portfolio (cf. Fig. 2) where he is forced at least to define
where the line of attractiveness may lie.
Fig. 2. Force Field Portfolio between economic and safety issues. The line of interest
must be defined by each individual, which is involved responsibly according to his
preference of values.
Very similar portfolio may be drawn for the conflict between the necessity
of well-based and expensive knowledge and the urge that is pressed by the term
‘time to market’ when developing new products and technologies. Thus the line of
interest or attractiveness of acquiring the necessary knowledge (for whom?) may
run along the field ‘stupid and too late’, ‘well-grounded and sophisticated, but too
late’, ‘quick and dirty’, and ‘well-grounded and just in time’, Again the cost function
will discriminate this fields.
One could comprehend this kind of conflicts also by the ‘Different Hat Ap-
proach’. This approach covers the experience that the young engineer Roger
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Boisjoly had to make in 1986, when warning about technical malfunction of details
shortly before the launch of the space shuttle Challenger. A manager of NASA said
him: ‘Take off your engineering hat and take on your management hat’.21 So he
was urged to shift his role responsibility from safety thinking to thinking in terms
of corporate identity and success at any price.
There may be different hats and many situations in which one is urged to
substitute the one hat for another one like the professional hat, the engineering
hat, the management hat, the religious hat, the ethnic hat, the cultural hat, and the
individual hat. A combinatorial set of such relations may classify a lot of conflicts
happening in the engineers’ world!
4. Technology and Ethics
4.1. Ethics to Whom it May Concern?
Ethics as a philosophical disciplinemay help to develop themoral self-understanding
and reflection of men. With respect to the task of engineers who are not profes-
sionally dealing with ethics, its history and logical structure and so on, any efforts
in moral thinking should provide to him means and rules to solve moral problems
like conflicts, meaningful interpretation and judgements.
4.2. Responsibility
The rise of the term responsibility in ethical debate since the late 70ies has brought
up a precision aboutwhat engineersmay feel or bemade responsible. Responsibility
has been defined in accordance to some ideas of Roman Right: Somebody has to
respond to questions before a court (the instance), about what he (the subject) has
done (object) by free will and free choice. Here we have already all constituents
for responsibility: The free subject, acting and generating effects, consequences
and impacts to a certain extent (object and reach), is responsible before an instance
(this may be a boss, a court, the husband, the children, the nation, the history or
God) and with respect to a moral judgement of this action the individual or a group
of persons or an institution may be subject of sanctions, rewards or punishment,
forced to compensate or make a damage minimal (liability).
In the modern society mostly the instance that executes sanctions is not the
same that the preferred instance of responsibility. In a highly divided world of
working, with distinguished competences and formal responsibilities, a diffusion of
responsibility can be observed: frequently decision is made by groups, committees
and institutions, not by single individuals and the compliance of the firms allows
21As reported in: Der Ingenieur – Held oder Netzbeschmutzer. In: DER SPIEGEL Spezial (1999,
Heft 1, S. 41–43.)
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them to prove that they have obeyed all relevant formal rules. This diffusion of
responsibility is a very trickery problem not only for courts and parliaments but
also for developers of new products and technology, since a product like a car is
never developed by a single individual. Even ‘the management’ does not consist
only of the company’ s president but encompasses a lot of people in different levels
on hierarchy of such an enterprise.
In well known cases (e.g. DOWIE [9], MACCORMAC [31], [32]) where ‘the
management’ has not only been made responsible by moral judgment, say for a
certain way of thinking strictly in economic terms, but engineers and managers
have been astonished by the fact that they have become responsible and liable with
respect to law in front of a court and that they were sentenced to jail.
The most astonishing in these cases is that engineers are astonished to become
lawfully responsible for what they are doing. They believed that the technological
mean they create to facilitate life and to ensure economic success would be morally
neutral. They believed for long time that it is only the individual user who decides
whether he uses a technical artefact in a good or bad way. But the situation has
changed dramatically due to the new technological possibilities: a nuclear weapon
is no more a neutral thing that can be let to the ‘user’ for free application or it is the
case with TV stations, World WideWeb, genetic products, medical care technology
and so on.
The conflicts have been turned to be conflicts in responsibility. The value
born conflicts between safety and economy are now becoming a conflict: who is
responsible for damages that have been caused by a non-hesitated and eager eco-
nomic and profit oriented thinking? Are these their shareholders, the management,
the engineers or the clients pressing prizes by selecting extremely their purchase
behaviour? Who is responsible for the shortcuts and obstacles of ecological policy?
Are they the politicians, the entrepreneurs thinking in old terms, the engineers, not
being able to be innovative in a non-classical field like alternative energy technology
or the citizen not able to change his consumers habits and not ready to pay more
for environmental issues but taxes? Is there a responsibility has not been cleared
before the complicated relation between interests of an enterprise and individual
interests, between responsibility in officium and universal morally responsibility?
4.3. Resolving Conflicts
Despite having recognized that ethical dilemma are unavoidable, the contemporary
ethic research has looked for means how to weaken or remove such conflicts when
they can be described as a moral dilemma.
One of the possibilities is offered in some principles that rule the conflict
between different laws concerning he same case. So, lex superior derogat legi
inferiori, (the law on a higher level is considered to be prior to a law on a lower
level), lex specialis derogat legi generali (the more specified law is applied prior to
general laws), lex posterior derogat legi priori (the law that has been announced at
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least will supersede the law announced before).
Another possibility is to change the meaning of relevant values or to add new
values on the value system. Of course the priority relation is the most prominent
issue: A change of these relations in terms of an informed consent will resolve
most of the problems, but not all of them. Sometimes only disambiguating unclear
priorities would help. This presupposes an open discourse at least.
In severe cases, one could apply so calledmeta-rules. Universalmoral respon-
sibility should supersede particular responsibilities in officium (or role responsibil-
ities). The problem is here to define clearly what a universal moral responsibility
does mean. Is there a universal moral law as Kant stated? If there is one who does
not believe in such kind of law, the universal moral responsibility must be defined in
another way. Introduced by H. LENK [29], 1993), one could argue that the instances
for sanction and “response” are on a higher level than for role responsibility – a
consciousness and a moral conviction is here a more primordial instance than the
boss of a company.
Another meta-rule has been given by WERHANE [43] and LENK [30]: Moral
rights of individuals should be preferred against utility issues. And, additionally:
‘Public welfare should be prior to particular individual interests as far as they are
not of moral nature’.
4.4. The Particular Case of Technology
All what is said up to now is valid in a general ethic debate and is related to
everybody’s moral live. Insofar every engineer is encompassed and one could
argue that a good and well-formulated moral should be sufficient for an engineer
even to cope with problems seemingly caused by his professional role.
We have therefore to show that Ethics for Engineers is not only a pragmatic
formulation of moral issues easy understandable for the hurrying up practioneer in
everyday practical life, but also a very wicked problem dealing with the structure
of technological knowledge.
In normal life (and even in a philosophical theory of action) one is used to
explain, why an individual has act in a certain way. Since Peter knows that he can
reach Amsterdam only by train tonight, and I know that Peter has successfully tried
to reach this train, I can conclude that Peter wanted to go to Amsterdam. This figure
is called the practical syllogism.
An engineer is proceeding a little bit the other way around: if he knows, that
A → B due to some causal relations, and he wants to put B into practice, he will
try to apply the rule B per A. This I called the pragmatic syllogism.
The decisive difference between the usual theories of action is, that the rule B
per A can be applied without knowing A → B. The statement is not explaining why
a subject has done A, but it gives a possibility to apply knowledge A → B (causal
relation) by transforming it into a rule (mean goal relation). This transformation is
not a deduction in a logical sense – knowledge is not founding logically the rule,
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only by a practical commitment. This pragmatic statement (as even the practical
syllogism) is not derivable in a modal deontic calculus, only the negative forms
(cf. KORNWACHS [23]). Moreover the rule expresses a normative statement: If B
is wanted (as a goal, according to a value defining it); A must be done (technical
ought).
Responsibility relates not only to the action A but also for the selection of B
and for the certainty and quality of the knowledge A → B, or, if this knowledge
is not available, for the effectiveness of the rule B per A. This makes things more
complicated than in everyday life action.
As an ideal case, doing Awill have the (reliable) effect B. In real life A causes
the intended effect B to a certain probability p (say in %) and some side-effects,
say B’, that could be known or unknown, wanted or not wanted, foreseenable or
not foreseenable. For example the development of a vaccination and its application
may cause not foreseenable harms. Another example is the well-known discussion
about the long-range perils of nuclear waste management.
These side effects can be classified according the following scheme
Table 1. Scheme for classifying side effects
Intended Not intended
Side Effect B’ Foreseeable Not foreseeable
Wanted Over- Synergies Positive surprise
Engineering
Marketing Effects
Not wanted ‘Crime’ Slippery Slope Technology
Argument Assessment
Looking on this scheme one can ask: What is the object of responsibility? The
application of the rule B per A as an action of an individual and all the consequences
of this application, including the unforeseenable side effects and the probability
of occurrence of B and the side effects? This has raised the question whether
probabilities could be moralised (ROPOHL [35]).
On might show, that the intended side-effects will occur with a certain prob-
ability, but for the unforeseenable side-effects, no probability can be estimated.
Surprise remains a surprise. Nobody can tell us something reliable about the geo-
logical behaviour of the same waste deposits over a range of 2000 years.
The main problem of Technology Assessment lies in the fact that the not
wanted and not known surprising side effects can be guessed hardly by forecast,
only by some intuitions or feelings. In a public discourse about technology, the
uttering of fears and bad perspective may lead to a more anxious mood where not
acceptable effects are presumed more frequently than in other discourses. So the
idea of moratorium has launched: Let us wait with possible dangerous technologies
until we know more about their side effects. Unfortunately, a lot of technologies
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have started to be applied without such knowledge like civil and military use of
nuclear energy, release of genetic manipulated organism, installation of large scale
systems without the possibility to draw the plug-in out like the World Wide Web,
the warning systems for space and flight control or the world wide electronic capital
exchange system.
If there are unacceptable side-effects of doing A that can be foreseen, this
could lead to the so called slippery slope argument: if we do A that may be itself
not morally wrong, we could start a process which will lead us to an unacceptable
side-effect B. Therefore, we have to postpone the action A (Cf. BURG, V. van der
[7]). The current synonyms for this type of arguments are the snowball-effect or
any domino theory.
The real dilemma starts, when an omitting of A that produces unacceptable
side effects B′, will cause another damage, let’s say C that may be caused by the
privation of the originally intended effect B. Thus, under the actual conditions a
substitution of nuclear energy by alternative forms of energy providing like sun or
bio-energy may be become very expensive. As an effect of this substitution a lack
of energy supply and economic breakdown have been guessed. Therefore to end
the nuclear energy, let’s say to omit A in order to avoid accidents like Chernobyl
(B ′) would produce another harm, i.e. a breakdown of economy.
This example is really sketched, very simplified in order to show the structure
of the dilemma. Mostly the difficulty lies in the estimation of B′ and C , and this
estimation cannot avoid the own interests, fears and concrete moral of the person or
institution, performing this estimation. Therefore, it is necessary to include moral
arguments in order tomake the discourse about technology and rational choice more
transparent.
5. The Principle of Conservation of the Possibility of Responsible Behaviour
5.1. Plurality and Many Value Principles
Therefore, we have to cope the situation that is no single, primordial value, under
which all other values could be subsumed, ordered or deduced. It is possible that
different values may have the same range such that priority is not unique – one of
the most frequent causes for conflicts. Moreover, the priority relation (hierarchical
order) aswell as the values and their semantic interpretation can be subject of chance
in time – even for an individual during his biography.
The most important issue is here the fact that there are values in one moral
context (say culture, religion, country, company whatsoever) that may not be con-
sidered as a value in another one and vice versa. So, the human rights have not the
same range in China as in Western World, life protection and individual health are
typical values of western culture but not in some others and a person when being
teenager is thinking in other terms of values than in his adult times.
Taking this serious, it should be possible to understand the moral judgement
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of somebody in a concrete case if one knows his values and priorities, principles
and norms. It should be possible to make translations between different morals
with respect to the judgment of the same case. This does not mean that one should
accept the value choice of the other subject under all circumstances but it helps to
understand why a person has acted in such and such ways.
In other word: the first step to get a presupposition for a conflict resolving
discourse is given by the trial to present the respective other moral in terms of own
moral. Here the differences become clearer.
If one believes that the possibility to act in a responsible way is a constituent
of human dignity and a good life, than we should enable us mutually to act in a
responsible way. Therefore, we must concede to everybody that he is trying to be
morally in the sense that he or she is trying to act in a responsible way according
to his or her actual moral system. This leads us to a principle that may enable us
to come to common set of norms, acceptable by a wide range of different moral
cultures or contexts invariantly from limited changes of value systems.
5.2. Conditions of Responsible Behaviour
To clarify the principle it is necessary to look for the conditions of responsible
behaviour. For this we remind to the constituting issues of the concept of responsi-
bility above. So we have to ensure the free choice of options or we have to ensure
that options do really exist. We have to ensure that the person in question can be
subject of responsibility by ensuring free will and conscious mind. There must be
a clear definition of the object of responsibility. Whether a firm or an engineer as a
single individual is responsible for unforeseenable side effects or not, is not clearly
discussed. Here must be an instance and it must be able to execute sanctions up
to liability or punishment. The time horizon for effects of action should be in the
range of human scale.
5.3. The Principle PCRB
We can now formulate the principle we propose for further discussion in the field
of engineering and ethics: Act in such a way that the condition of the possibilities
for responsible behaviour be conserved for all individuals involved (KORNWACHS
[21], [22]).
The principle has been presented in German literature elsewhere, but there
are some consequences of the principle that are relevant to engineering field. The
Principle of Conservation the Conditions of Responsible Behaviour (PCRB) is only
practicable with respecting the fact of plurality of values as indicated below. We
have to concede that ‘the other’ is judging his thoughts, actions and effects in terms
of his own moral systems with the respective values. In conflict ‘the other’ will
judge my actions and produce effects in his moral terms firstly, and so do I. The
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respective moral system of ‘the other’, the existence and applicability thereof is
necessary for his moral existence. So I have to recognise it by translating in my
own terms. This is considered to be a duty – I have to ‘understand’ the moral
system of ‘the other’. Of course this duty should be considered to be mutual. As
a direct result the requirement of tolerance and the impossibility of intolerance can
be deduced. Nevertheless, mutual understanding and tolerance does not mean that
we have to accept or to nostrificate the moral choice of the other. But we must
accept that he has the right and the duty to make a moral choice consciously and
act according to it.
Thus it would be against the principle to let run somebody in a moral dilemma
where he is nomore able to act morally, since every option he has, will lead tomortal
unacceptable results.
5.4. Engineering Issues of PCRB
Wecan now apply the PCRB to the particular case of the pragmatic syllogism. To do
this, we check the conditions for responsible behaviour according to the component
of the pragmatic syllogism, schown in Table 2.
Table 2. The pragmatic syllogism and he conditions for responsibility
Conditions for
Responsibility
Knowledge
A → B B per A
Aims and Goals
(Will) B!
Action
A
Effect
B and p%(B)
Side-Effect
B ′ and p%(B ′)
Free choice Free research,
Options
Discourse No force to
perform A
Subject of R. Who is in charge
of something?
Duty to know
Reflect about B ,
if B ′ and p%(B ′)
is known
Individual or
collective
Producers
Liability
Liability by
principle of
causation
Object of R. Reliability of
A→B > B per A
Duty to estimate
p% (B)
Responsibility
for choice of B
Action Can probability
be moralized?
Responsible for
surprise?
Instance Science and En-
gineering Com-
munity
Market, boss,
individual con-
sciousness
The embedding
organisation
All persons who
are involved
All persons
who could be in-
volved
Time horizon Validity of ac-
tual knowledge
longer than v. of
technology
Planning time,
decision time,
time to act, long
term effects
Time range of
action itself (e.g.
inter-generation
projects)
Long term ef-
fects.
Sustainability
problem
Sustainability,
Moratorium,
Deceleration
Sanctions No? Technical
norms. Ethic
codex
Not on a legal
level
Institutions
(legal, social,
moral)
Polluters pay
principle,
causers
principle
Not clear
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Most parts of the table may be self-explaining, but some comments should be
given here.
The requirement of free choice with respect to the necessary knowledge leads
to the condition of free research without force of premature application on the one
side of theoretical knowledge, and on the other side of practical or technological
knowledge there should be always the possibility to have options A′ or A′′ in order
to put B into practice. In other worlds: there should be not only free research but
also ‘free design’. A discourse about goals and aims (B!) should be possible and
there should not be a technological ought to be forced to do A.
The subject of responsibility is in charge to acquire the necessary theoretical
and practical knowledge; there is a ‘Duty to Know’. The subject of responsibility
has to reflect about the goals and the possible outcomes if B′ and the probability of
its success, say p%(B ′) is known. The action Amay be done by an individual or by
a collective – but a satisfying theory about institutional or collective responsibility
has not yet developed.
The object of responsibility is not simply to determine. An engineer is in
charge to check the reliability of knowledge A → B (if known) and at any case
the technological rule B per A. He has the duty to estimate the probabilities p if
possible and he or his company or another institution are responsible for the choice
of the goal B. Of course he is responsible for performing the action A, but it remains
highly questionable whether he can be made responsible for surprising effects. It
has been argued (GRUNWALD [11], ROPOHL [35], BANSE [2]) that probability
cannot be moralized. On the other hand, technology assessment has developed
some methods to get rid with the surprise. Since there is no possibility to estimate
probabilities of possibilities that are known, one can sketch so called development
paths of technology. Let us see what could be happen if a development will run
fast, normal or slowly. Without estimating probability one obtains a list of fields of
possible impacts than may give some hints for surprising developments. Of course
this method is not sufficient and it does not remove uncertainty at all, but it widens
the scope at least and it should be a duty to perform such methods.
The instances for engineering actions are manifold: Science and Engineering
Community plays the role of audience for knowledge applied, markets, bosses
up to the individual consciousness may ‘control’ the decision for or adapting of
a certain goal, the embedding organisation up to the cultural context (moral field)
may be relevant for the concrete action A and an engineer should respect all persons
who are involved in the effect of his action as an instance for his responsibility.
Concerning side effects and surprises, the problem is present whether all persons,
who could be involved, now and in future, should be considered as instance. Here
we have the question of responsibility toward future generations. The answers
run from no obligation argument up to the position that we are obliged to inform
future generations about the possible long term effects of our nowadays or planned
technology.22
22This issue has been discussed in BERNDES, KORNWACHS [4, 5], BERNDES [3], and KO-
RNWACHS, [24].
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Related to this point very closely the specific time horizon must be taken into
account. The validity of actual knowledge may run longer than the validity of actual
technology. Nevertheless, one has to consider that there is always a certain half time
of validity of knowledge. To define a goal and to look for means in order to reach the
goal, it takes time. This planning time has to be distinguished from decision time,
from the time to do the action A, and from the time horizon of short term and long-
term effects. The time range of action itself may be long, takes for instance projects
longing over generations like swamp or forest cultivation, building cathedrals or
dams. Mostly the long-term effects are the not wanted side effects. This affects the
sustainability problem and how to handle it: should we support a moratorium if we
are not sure whether there will be not wanted side effects endangering the ecological
basis of human life? Should we decelerate the technological development when
we got the impression that the change will running faster than the development of
means to cope it?
The possibility of sanctions has also to be discussed. With respect of knowl-
edge, even scientific knowledge, there is no sanction possible beside the cases of
fabrication, manipulation, plagiarism and fraud. But violating technical norm (like
defined by industrial norms and standards) could be subject of very hard sanctions,
also the violation of safety rules. What we wanted is hardly the subject of moral
judgement, whereas values are driving our choice as discussed below. Therefore,
one should emphasize this point very clearly: The choice of goals or the acceptance
and adapting of them is an act for which an engineer is responsible if he is free to do
so. But, in most cases he has to accept goals given by the institution he has joined
to work with. Therefore, in this case an ethic codex for engineers may be helpful
in order to protect an engineer if he tries to solve a conflict between his values and
the values of the enterprise when morally judging the goals in question. Even in
such cases it is important for the enterprise to enable responsible behaviour of the
individual encountered with it and it is important for an engineer to understand the
values and aims of an enterprise in terms of his own moral system. If he recognizes
that he cannot solve the conflict, he should be free to leave the enterprise without
sanctions and the loss of job possibilities.23
On the other hand, the resulting damage of a certain action should be com-
pensated or attenuated by the responsible actor. Thus the Polluters Pay Principle
in Ecology as a concretisation of the Causer’ s Principle that has gained a broad
acceptance. But it is still unclear who can be made liable for surprising effects
that may lead to disaster or catastrophes. The question mostly is posed around the
problem, how surprising the side-effect may really has been for the causer, doing
A, leading to B′.
23This problem has become well known as the Whistleblower Problem; cf. SPIER ([39], p. 25. ff.).
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6. Outlook
The discussion about the conflicts in engineering field concerning ethics and moral
has lead us to the ethical principle to conserve the conditions of the possibility of
responsible behaviour. Whereas we believe that this principle is a very general
one, it may be applied also in engineering fields. Here we have found that some
interesting norms can be obtained. These findings are invariant from a chosen value
system and its priorities (where the most differences could be found).
• One of these norms is discussed as the duty to know, see below.
• A further norm is the duty to hand on knowledge (in form of understandable
information) to future generations about the long term effects of nowadays
and planned technologies
• Another requirement is to act in such way that moral dilemma can be avoided
in advance. When respecting the PCRB and the plurality of value systems
as discussed below, we may use the resolving power of PCRB, providing the
procedure of discourse with the duty of mutual translation of the respective
moral system.
• Since most of us runs into moral dilemma since we are not heroes to solve
them, the shaping tasks in engineering, technology and society should be to
facilitate non-heroic solution when dealing with technology and organisa-
tions.
On this basis an Ethic Codex has been proposed.24 The role of an Ethic Codex
in a legal, professional and political context can be summarized as follows: The
target group contains professionals within defined area of working (e.g. engineers
or managers) with strong power of shaping living conditions and therefore with
high responsibility standard requirements. The effect lies in an orientation in moral
and ethical questions for decision support, not in a substitution or automatisation
of it. Member’s support in moral problem solving and a certain protection by their
professional association is intended primarily.
It is expected that such a code ensures a self-binding and self-obligation by
accepting such a codex. It may influence and give an impact on public opinion and
public moral discussion. There is an important legal effect when court judgement
is forced to be oriented according to the ‘state of the art’ in a respective discipline.
A codex supports a permanent conscious foundation for moral judgement in pro-
fessional life by accompanying the codex with background writings and seminars.
Certain orientation pressure for technology politics is not excluded.
Further investigation of the consequences and impacts of the proposed PCRB
is surely necessary. It remains the conviction of the author that there is no particular
engineering ethics necessary but awidening and improving of ourwell-knownethics
due to changed world.
24The Ethic Code of Association of German Engineers (VDI) has been discussed in 1998–2000 by
the Committee for Technology and Philosophy, Subgroup Engineer and Responsibility. First Proposal
to VDI was made in March 2000, for interior discussion. Final Edition is expected Summer 2002,
(published, translated and representing then a legal part of the members contract)
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